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Does it work ?
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Is it there when we need it ?
7BACKGROUND
Operational Suitability is a major 
determinant of Ao.
Ao =  UPTIME/(UPTIME + DOWNTIME)
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Why field before addressing these problems?  Urgent Combat Need
The QUESTION:  How much does it cost us to do business this way?
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BACKGROUND
2006 DOTE Annual Report to Congress:
Dr. McQueary’s 3 Observations:
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2006 DOTE Annual Report to Congress:
Dr. McQueary’s 3 Observations:
1.  OT&E is too often the place where performance 
deficiencies are discovered
2.  DoD Acquisition is too slow (warfighters need more 
rapid fielding of new technologies)
3. Operational Suitability is too low, and needs to 
improve.
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Suitability . . . at what cost?
DAU Research Study Proposal
Investigate various types of systems 
Total of 5 or 6, several from each service
Criteria:
Recently fielded
Evaluated to be Effective but not “fully” Suitable
Examine performance of systems wrt suitability
Determine suitability cost drivers
Evaluate suitability trends
Sponsor Decision: Start with one program, work from there . . . . .
First Program Selected: STRYKER Family of Vehicles
Additional Study Candidates: TBD
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Stryker Family of Vehicles
19
ATEC Reliability Track Record





















































































Most Of Our Systems Fail To Achieve Reliability Requirements In OT
. . . And The Trend Appears To Be Continuing Downward 
1985-1990 1996-2000
Now, back to Suitability . . . .
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1996 - 2006
Amongst Systems Which Did Not Meet Reliability Requirements In OT,
75% Of Them Failed To Achieve Half Of Their Requirement






















































Operations & Support (O&S)
Sustainment
65-80% of  the  Life Cycle Cost
USD(AT&L)  Strategic Goals Emphasize Sustainment Outcomes 





O&S Costs Are Determined Early In The Acquisition Phase
Life Cycle Management
24
“As Government expenditures, those 
due to broken down chariots, worn-
out horses, armor and helmets, 
arrows, and crossbows, lances, hand 
and body shields, draft animals and 
supply wagons will amount to 60% 
of the total.”
Sun Tzu (The Art of War, 6th Century B.C.)
Life Cycle Costing Considerations
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1940     1950      1960     1970     1980      1990     2000    2010      2020      2030     2040
94 yrsB-52











SOURCE:  John F. Phillips DUSD (L)
Defense System Life Cycles
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DoD Directive (5000.1)
“PMs shall consider supportability, 
life cycle costs, performance, and 





SUBJECT:   The Defense Acquisition System 
References: 
(a) DoD Directive 5000.1, “The Defense Acquisition System,” October 23, 2000 (hereby 
canceled) 
(b) DoD Instruction 5000.2, “Operation of the Defense Acquisition System,” May 12, 2003 
(c) DoD 5025.1-M, “DoD Directives System Procedures,” current edition 
(d) Title 10, United States Code, “Armed Forces” 
(e) Section 2350a of title 10, United States Code, “Cooperative Research and Development 
Projects: Allied Countries” 
(f) Section 2751 of title 22, United States Code,  “Need for international defense cooperation 
and military export controls; Presidential waiver; report to Congress; arms sales policy” 
(g) Section 2531 of title 10, United States Code, “Defense memoranda of understanding and 
related agreements” 
(h) Federal Acquisition Regulation (FAR), current edition 
(i) Section 1004, Public Law 107-314, “Bob Stump National Defense Authorization Act for 
Fiscal Year 2003,” “Development and Implementation of Financial Management Enterprise 
Architecture” 
(j) DoD Directive 8500.1, “Information Assurance (IA),” October 24, 2002 
(k) DoD Directive 4630.5, “Interoperability and Supportability of Information Technology (IT) 
and National Security Systems (NSS),” January 11, 2002 
(l) DoD Directive 2060.1, “Implementation of, and Compliance with, Arms Control 
Agreements,” January 9, 2001 
1. PURPOSE  
This Directive: 
1.1. Reissues reference (a) and authorizes publication of reference (b). 
1.2. Along with reference (b), provides management principles and mandatory policies 
and procedures for managing all acquisition programs. 
2. APPLICABILITY AND SCOPE 
2.1. This Directive applies to the Office of the Secretary of Defense, the Military 
Departments, the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, the Combatant Commands, the Office of 
the Inspector General of the Department of Defense, the Defense Agencies, the DoD Field 
Activities, and all organizational entities within the Department of Defense (hereafter 
collectively referred to as "the DoD Components"). 
2.2. The policies in this Directive apply to all acquisition programs. 
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AT&L Memo:  22 Nov 2004
(Subj: Total Life Cycle Systems Management (TLCSM) Metrics)
Emphasizes use of PBL (Performance-Based 
Logistics) for all weapons
Provides Specific Definitions (and Formulas) for 
the following metrics:
1. Ao (Operational Availability)
2. Mission Reliability
3. TLCS Cost per Unit of Usage
4. Cost per Unit of Usage
5. Logistics Footprint
6. Logistics Response Time
28
Total Life Cycle Systems 
Management Metrics
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JROC Memo:  17 Aug 2006
(Subj: Key Performance Parameters Study Recommendations and Implementation)
1. Endorsed Mandatory “MATERIEL AVAILABILITY” Key Performance 
Parameter (KPP) for all MDAPs and Select ACAT II and III
With 2 Supporting Key System Attributes (KSAs):
A. Materiel Reliability 
B. Ownership Costs 
2. Endorsed ENERGY EFFICIENCY KPP for selected programs, as appropriate
3. Endorsed TRAINING KPP for selected programs, as appropriate





FORCE PROTECTION AND SURVIVABILITY
30




• Materiel Availability (=                                                 )
• Mandatory KSAs:
• Materiel Reliability (MTBF)(=                                      )
• Ownership Cost (O&S costs associated w/materiel readiness)
• For mission success, Combatant Commanders need: 
• Correct number of operational end items capable of performing 
the mission when needed
• Confidence that systems will perform the mission and return 
home safely without failure
• Ownership Cost provides balance; solutions cannot 
be availability and reliability “at any cost.”
JROC Approved* Mandatory Sustainment 
KPP and KSAs
Number of End Items Operational 
Total Population of End Items
Total Operating Hours 
Total Number of Failures
*JROC Approval Letter JROCM 161-06 Signed 17 Aug 06;
Revised CJCS 3170 will put into Policy
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• Materiel Availability (KPP*)
– A Key Data Element Used In Maintenance 
And Logistics Planning
• Material Reliability (KSA*)
– Provides A Measure Of How Often The System Fails/Requires Maintenance
– Another Key Data Element In Forecasting Maintenance/Logistics Needs
• Ownership Cost (KSA*)
– Focused On The Sustainment Aspects Of The System
– An Essential Metric For Sustainment Planning And Execution 
– Useful For Trend Analyses – Supports Design Improvements/Modifications
• Mean Downtime
– A Measure Of How Long A System Will Be Unavailable After A Failure
– Another Key Piece Used In The Maintenance/Logistics Planning Process
• Other Sustainment Outcome Metrics May Be Critical To Specific 
Systems, And Should Be Added As Appropriate
* Sustainment KPP & KSAs Included In Revised Draft CJCSM 3170
“Proposed” Life Cycle Sustainment 
Outcome Metrics (2006)
These 4 Life Cycle Sustainment Outcome Metrics Are Universal
Across All Programs And Are Essential To Effective Sustainment Planning
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DUSD AT&L Metrics Evolution
DUSD L&MR Life Cycle 
Sustainment Metrics (Mar 07)
USD AT&L TLCSM Metrics 
(Nov 05)
• Operational Availability (Ao)
• Materiel Availability  (1)
• Key Performance Parameter (KPP)       
(per Aug 06 JROC Memo)
• Total Life Cycle System Cost per 
Unit of Usage 
• Cost Per Unit of Usage
• Ownership Cost  (3)
• New Key System Attribute (KSA)     
(per Aug 06 JROC Memo)
• Logistics Footprint
• Mean Down Time (MDT)  (4)
• Mission Reliability
• Logistics Response Time (LRT)
• Material Reliability  (2)
• New Key System Attribute (KSA)     
(per Aug 06 JROC Memo)
• No Corresponding New Metric
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DUSD (L&MR) Memo – 10 March 2007
Subj: Life Cycle Sustainment Metric Outcomes
. . .  In July 2006, JROC established mandatory KPP: “Materiel Availability”
along with KSAs: “Material Reliability” and “Ownership Costs”
This memo (March 2007) provides definitions of these terms and adds one additional parameter: “Mean Down Time”




4. Mean Down Time
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DUSD (L&MR) Memo – 10 March 2007
14  Life Cycle Sustainment (LCS) Enablers
1. Performance Based Logistics (PBL)
2. Corrosion Prevention
3. Item Unique Identification (IUID)/Serialized Item Management (SIM)
4. Tech Data/IETM
5. Condition-Based Maintenance (CBM+)
6. Continuous Process Improvement (CPI)
7. Title 10 Partnering Requirements - 50/50
8. Depot Maintenance Plan
9. Obsolescence Plan, Diminishing Manufacturing Sources and 
Material Shortages (DMSMS)
10. Training
11. Integrated Supply Chain Management (SCM)
12. Radio Frequency Identification (RFID)
13. Predictive Modeling
14. Long Term Performance Based Agreements (PBA)
36
PBL Guidance Evolution, 1998-2008
• Fiscal Year 1998 Section 912(c) of the National Defense 
Authorization Act (not shown)
• “Secretary of Defense Report to Congress: Actions to Accelerate 
the Movement to the New Workforce Vision” in Response to 
Section 912(c) of the NDAA for FY 1998 (Apr 1998)
• Product Support for the 21st Century:  Report of the Department 
of Defense (DoD) Product Support Reengineering 
Implementation Team Section 912(c) (Jul 1999)
• Product Support for the 21st Century: A Year Later (Sep 2000)
• Product Support for the 21st Century: A Program Manager’s 
Guide to Buying Performance (Nov 2001)
• DoDD 5000.1 The Defense Acquisition System (May 2003) and 
DoDI 5000.2 Operation of the Defense Acquisition System (May 
2003)
• Defense Acquisition Guidebook (DAG), Chapter 5 (2004 & After) 
(not shown)
• Performance Based Logistics: A Program Manager’s Product 
Support Guide (Mar 2005)
“My vision of the acquisition workforce 10 years from now is one that is smaller and in fewer organizations; 
is focused on managing suppliers, rather than supplies; and is focused on the total cost of ownership
to provide and support high quality goods and services required by our warfighting men and women.”
-- Secretary of Defense William Cohen, April 1998
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• Research Objective
– To conduct a research study to quantify the difference 
between projected O&S costs (associated with the 
RAM requirement) and the actual costs associated 
with the achieved level of operational suitability. That 
is, quantify the costs of not achieving adequate levels 
of operational suitability.
Research Proposal:
Examine suitability performance 





• Phase 1- Initial Program (Stryker)
a. Understand the problem
b. Define detailed study objectives
c. Collect data
d. Analyze data and build models
e. IPR at T&E Conference - Hilton Head 
f. Acquire additional data as needed
g. Draft report
h. Finalize report
• Phase 2 - Analysis of 5 additional 
programs covering multiple types
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Data Collection
– Stryker PM Team (TACOM  Warren, MI)
– AEC RAM Directorate – Aberdeen (ATEC)
– OTC Reps (Ft. Hood, TX)
– AT&L Rep (Pentagon, WASH DC)
– IDA (Arlington, VA)
– LMI (Falls Church, VA)
– GDLS CDRL Data (Warren, MI)
– Fort Lewis Stryker Team (Ft Lewis, WA)
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Findings & Observations
• Warfighters very satisfied with Stryker performance 
in-theatre
• Brigade Commanders extremely happy with ICLS
• High Operational Readiness Rates, but ORR is 
prioritized over support costs
• Very High Op Temp in-theatre
• Operational Environment much different than 
expected
– Mission Profile not accurate (80% Primary Roads)
– Harsh usage – roads, curbs, higher tire pressure, excess 
weight
– Excessive stresses on vehicle:
• Over-inflated tires – auto system doesn’t work (log burden)
• High tire replacement rate
• Wheel spindles fatigue cracks
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Findings & Observations
• Combat re-configurations necessary for safety:
– Armor, RPG Cage, Sand Bags … add excessive weight to 
vehicle (affecting reliability and performance)
• Army did not buy Tech Data Pkg – “Prohibitively 
expensive” . . . risk to government
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Other Findings 
• Immature Maintenance Procedures- many procedures 
have not been validated in IETMs (interactive 
electronic tech manuals) lead to: 
– “Tribal System Maintenance” from experienced crews ( 
“. . . that new book isn’t any good . . . . . . . . . . . this is the way 
it worked on the M113, so do it like this”)
• With Kr support to maintain vehicles, soldier crews 
develop “rental car mentality” . . . 
– Lack of ownership mentality . . . overly dependent on 
contractor  
– Sometimes they forget the basics (oil check)
– One vehicle lost because pre-mission checks were ignored
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Other Findings 
• Stryker initial deployment/fielding was 
extremely accelerated to meet urgent combat 
need





• Conducting combat operations
• The threat and the operational environment 
were much different than anticipated
Cost Per Mile Analysis
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Cost Per Mile (CPM)
• CPM  is a planning tool used to project future budget 
requirements.
• No specific value of CPM required by contract.
• Govt/Kr both calculate CPM independently, and use 
results to negotiate parts cost forecasts to determine 
purchasing requirements .




• CDRL A003 (Aug 2006)
– Parts Consumption Report (for ~ 1 yr)
– Good quality data (possibly some errors in 
mileage or dates)
• CDRL A004 (Aug 2006)
– Repairable Items Repair Cost Summary
– Most repair items have estimates or quotes
– ~ 26% of total consumable parts___ % parts 
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Cost Per Mile Analysis
Cost Per Mile =
Labor : Average of $4.73M per brigade
Replacement Parts : from CDRL A003 Consumption Report
Part Repair : No historical data for many parts
Existing data from CDRL A004 (Repairable 
Items Repair Cost Summary
Vehicle Mileage : Does not exist for all vehicles
Questionable accuracy
Labor + Replacement Parts + Part Repair 
Total Vehicle Mileage 
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Vehicle Miles Per Day From A003  (CONUS)






















Maximum Limit For CONUS CPM Estimate
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Repair Cost (%) Without Scrap
Model
- Parametric model to estimate repair costs as a function of 
replacement cost.
- Did not factor in warranty items
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Estimating the Repair Cost per Mile
For each 







• Estimate cost per mile from consumption report.
• Vehicle mileage
• Quantity consumed
• Average repair cost (including scrap nbut not 
including warranty)
• Correction needed to raw data.
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CONUS Cost/Mile
ICLS Labor, Replacement Parts, Part Repair
Assumptions: Each vehicle < 5k total miles, < 100 miles/day 




Repair Cost in 
Computation






ICV 345 $1,581,641 218,138                   $7.25 7.56 $9.41
MCV 101 $279,921 22,504                     $12.44 5.39 $14.59
ATGM 43 $172,499 20,200                     $8.54 6.67 $10.69
ESV 29 $395,797 28,970                     $13.66 9.51 $15.82
FSV 33 $165,540 18,558                     $8.92 6.90 $11.08
MEV 35 $66,682 17,405                     $3.83 6.16 $5.99
RV 161 $559,520 110,313                   $5.07 7.32 $7.23
All vehicles 747 $3,221,599 436,088                 $7.39 7.31 $13.30
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Deployed Cost per Mile
ICLS Labor, Replacement Parts, Part Repair
Assumptions: Each vehicle < 20k total miles, < 400 miles/day 
average, 30% repair cost for Power Pack
– Model assumes $4.73M per brigade





Repair Cost in 
Computation






ICV 315 $8,225,102 1,108,756                $7.42 36.93 $9.57
MCV 70 $765,983 120,708                   $6.35 22.08 $8.50
ATGM 52 $1,393,062 218,260                   $6.38 43.50 $8.54
ESV 28 $587,658 134,119                   $4.38 64.33 $6.54
FSV 27 $486,028 95,890                     $5.07 36.94 $7.22
MEV 38 $223,414 79,945                     $2.79 25.70 $4.95
RV 126 $2,303,741 317,632                   $7.25 31.72 $9.41
All vehicles 656 $13,984,989 2,075,310              $6.74 35.59 $7.95
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Cost Per Mile (CPM) Estimates
• CPM estimate - $17.19 (GAO 04-925, including labor, parts & repair)
• CPM estimate - $18.78 (Stryker R-TOC Brief)
• CPM estimate - $18.23 (based on M113 methodology w/Stryker 
adjustments)
• CPM estimate - $14.53 (based on initial 4 month deployment data)
• CPM estimate (GDLS) - $13.52 garrison
$  8.88 deployed
• DAU CPM estimate – $ 13.30 garrison  
$   7.95 deployed
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Conclusions
Stryker was not designed for the threat it is facing.
Stryker was not designed for the operational environment it is
experiencing.
Accelerated deployment resulted in many concurrent activities: 
Testing, Production, Deployment, Combat
Stryker is doing the job.  Crews are overcoming obstacles.
Costs of marginal suitability is not determined.  Data not available.
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Conclusions
OPERATIONAL READINESS RATE (ORR):
• Contractual requirement: ORR > 90% 
– Does not include GFE (base vehicle configuration only)
• Stryker consistently above requirement
– Recent ORR data point: 97% (20 Feb 07)
• Cost-plus-fixed-fee contract motivates GDLS to meet 
ORR . . . .
– However, contract does not incentivise controlling costs . . . 
risk to government
– Example – to repair cracked hydraulic reservoirs in power 
pack, whole power pack is replaced in field  
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Conclusions
OPERATIONAL READINESS RATE (ORR):
• Operational Readiness Rate not necessarily 
consistent with traditional Ao (Operational Availability)
– RAM issues can be masked by ORR
• Mission Completion vs. Subsystem Failure
– Possibly leads to overestimating system reliability due to non-
reporting on individual subsystem (component) failures 
– Multi-mission vehicle – with subsystem failures, system can still 
perform alternate missions
• Reporting Criteria Issue:
– ORR vs. MTBF of individual subsystems
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Stryker Fleet Readiness
ORR vs Strykers Fielded

















































































































































• Reliability requirement as defined in ORD are 
not appropriate
– 4.3.1.3. The Stryker (vehicle only, excluding GFE 
components/systems) will have a reliability of 1000 mean 
miles between critical failure (i.e., system aborts).
• Reliability issues and cost drivers found 





• Field usage much harsher than planned
– e.g., higher tire pressure, roads, curbs, weight (armor, sandbags)
• Mission Profile says 80% XCountry, 20% Primary Roads
– in-theater mission just the opposite . . . most missions in urban environment (police action) 
on paved roads
• OpTempo very high (>10X)
– High OpTempo may improve reliability numbers, but beats up equipment
– With low usage, seals can dry up, humidity can build up in electrical components
• Changes in mission & configuration are putting excess stress on 
vehicle: armor/sandbags, over inflated tires, going over curbs
– replacing 9 tires/day (>3200 tires/yr)
– wheel spindles developing fatigue cracks
– drive shafts breaking 
– prescribed tire pressure is 80 PSI, however, with slat armor/sandbags – must maintain >95 
PSI
– 95 PSI is a logistics burden on operators
• Must be maintained by the soldier (tire inflation system can’t do it)




• Slat Armor & cage design (additional 5000 lb) is effective for many RPG 
threats, but negatively impacts size, weight and performance of Stryker
– Causes multiple problems for safe and effective operation 
• Slat armor on rear ramp too heavy - greatly strains lifting equipment 
– Occasionally, crews must assist raising/lowering ramp
• Bolts on rear ramp break off frequently with normal use
• Slat armor bends with continued ops  . . . can cover escape hatches and block rear troop 
door in ramp
• Slat armor interferes with driver’s vision
• Slat armor difficult for other traffic to see at night . . . Safety hazard in urban environment
• Slat Armor prohibits normal use of exterior storage racks
– Significantly impacts handling/performance in wet conditions
• Adds excessive strain on engine, drive shafts, differentials
– Impairs off-road ops, larger footprint
• Though not designed primarily for the urban fight (MOUT), Stryker is 
well-suited for it
– Unlike M-1, Stryker is “ghostly” quiet  . . . tactical advantage
• Stryker overall OIF performance significantly better than HUMVEE, 
BRADLEY or M-1 in this environment 
